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Abstract. This work shows that the cryptanalysis of the shrinking generator requires 
fewer intercepted bits than what indicated by the linear complexity. Indeed, whereas the 
linear complexity of shrunken sequences is between A ⋅ 2(S-2) and A ⋅ 2(S-1), we claim that 
the initial states of both component registers are easily computed with less than A ⋅ S 
shrunken bits. Such a result is proven thanks to the definition of shrunken sequences as 
interleaved sequences. Consequently, it is conjectured that this statement can be extended 
to all interleaved sequences. Furthermore, this paper confirms that certain bits of the 
interleaved sequences have a greater strategic importance than others, which may be 
considered as a proof of weakness of interleaved generators. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Stream ciphers are considered nowadays the fastest encryption procedures. 
Consequently, they are implemented in many practical applications e.g. the 
algorithms A5 in GSM communications (GSM), the encryption system E0 in 
Bluetooth specifications (Bluetooth) or the algorithm RC4 (Rivest, 1998) used in 
SSL, WEP and Microsoft Word and Excel. 
From a short secret key (known only by the two interested parties) and a 
public algorithm (the sequence generator), a stream cipher procedure is based on 
the generation of a long sequence of seemingly random bits. Such a sequence is 
called the keystream sequence. 
For the encryption, the sender computes the bitwise exclusive OR (XOR) 
operation among the bits of the original message or plaintext and the keystream 
sequence. The result is the ciphertext to be sent. For the decryption, the receiver 
generates the same keystream, computes the same bitwise XOR operation 
between the received ciphertext and the keystream sequence and obtains again the 
original message. 
Most keystream generators are based on Linear Feedback Shift Registers 
(LFSRs) (Golomb, 1982), which are linear structures characterized by their length 
(the number of memory cells), their characteristic polynomial (the feedback 
function) and their initial states (the seed or key of the cryptosystem). If the 
characteristic polynomial is a primitive polynomial (Lidl and Niederreiter, 1986), 
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then the LFSRs generate Pseudo-Noise sequences (PN-sequences) with good 
pseudorandomness properties.  
For a survey on primitive LFSRs, PN-sequences and shift equivalences, the 
interested reader is referred to (Golomb, 1982). In stream cipher procedures, the 
PN-sequences are combined by means of nonlinear functions in order to produce 
keystream sequences for cryptographic application. Combinational generators, 
nonlinear filters, clock-controlled generators and irregularly decimated generators 
are just some of the most popular nonlinear sequence generators. All of them 
produce keystreams with high linear complexity, long period and good statistical 
properties (Caballero-Gil and Fúster-Sabater, 2004) (Fúster-Sabater, 2004). 
Most cryptanalysis on stream ciphers are performed under a known plaintext 
hypothesis, that is to say, it is assumed that the attacker has direct access to a 
portion of the keystream sequence (the intercepted sequence). From these 
intercepted bits, the attacker has to deduce the cryptosystem key. Once the key is 
known, as the sequence generator is public, the whole keystream sequence can be 
reconstructed. The complexity of this attack is always compared with that of key 
exhaustive search and if the former complexity is lesser, the cryptosystem is said 
to be broken. 
This work focuses on a particular kind of stream ciphers based on LFSRs: the 
class of shrinking generators. They are made out of two LFSRs and an irregular 
decimation. Shrinking generators have been thoroughly analyzed in several papers 
such as (Simpson et al, 1998), (Kanso, 2003) and (Caballero-Gil and Fúster-
Sabater, 2006). Nevertheless, we present a new and efficient cryptanalytic attack 
requiring much lesser amount of intercepted bits than that of the previous attacks. 
The basic idea of this cryptanalysis consists in defining the output sequence of a 
shrinking generator as an interleaved sequence (see (Gong, 1995) and (Jiang et al, 
2002)). The interleaved characteristic of the shrinking generator reveals 
weaknesses that lead to practical attacks. In addition, we conjecture that these 
weaknesses can be extended to all interleaved sequence generators with 
application in cryptography. 
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, the description and 
characteristics of the shrinking generator is introduced. Interleaved configuration 
and related results are developed in section 3. A cryptanalytic attack against the 
shrinking generator that exploits the condition of interleaved sequence is 
presented in section 4, while the generalization of this technique to other 
cryptographic interleaved generators appears in section 5. Finally, conclusions in 
section 6 end the paper. 
 
2 The Shrinking Generator 
 
The so-called Shrinking Generator (SG) is a nonlinear keystream generator 
composed by two LFSRs (Coppersmith et al, 1993) so that a control register SRS 
decimates the sequence produced by the other register SRA. S and A denote 
respectively their corresponding lengths and fulfil that (S, A)= 1 and S<A. PS(x) 
and PA(x)∈ GF(2)[x] denote their corresponding primitive characteristic 
polynomials.  
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The sequence {si}, produced by SRS, controls the bits of the sequence {ai} 
produced by SRA which are included in the output shrunken sequence {zj} 
according to the following rule: If si=1 then zj=ai, and if si=0 then ai is discarded. 
As different pairs of SRA/SRS initial states can generate the same shrunken 
sequence, in the sequel we assume, without loss of generality, that the first term of 
the sequence {si} equals 1, that is s0=1. According to (Coppersmith et al, 1994), 
the period of the shrunken sequence is:  
T= (2A-1) 2(S-1), 
its linear complexity, notated LC, satisfies the following inequality: 
A ⋅ 2 (S-2) < LC ≤ A ⋅ 2 (S-1), 
and its characteristic polynomial is of the form: 
Pss(x)= (P(x)) p 
where P(x) is an A-degree primitive polynomial in GF(2)[x] and p is an integer in 
the interval 2(S-2) < p ≤ 2 (S-1). Moreover, it can be proven (Shparlinski, 2001) that 
the shrunken sequence has also good distributional statistics. Therefore, due to all 
these good characteristics, this scheme has been traditionally used as keystream 
sequence generator with application in secret-key cryptography. 
 
3 Interleaved Configuration 
 
The (2A-1)⋅ 2(S-1) bits of a period of any shrunken sequence {zj} can be arranged 
into a (2A-1)× 2(S-1) matrix that we will call Interleaved Configuration and will 
denote by IC. In fact, 
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The following result allows us to identify each element of the matrix IC with 
the corresponding term of the sequence {ai}. 
 
Theorem 3.1 
The Interleaved Configuration of the shrunken sequence {zj} can be written in 
terms of the elements of the sequence {ai} such as follows: 
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where the additive sub-indices oj (j= 0, 1, …, 2S-1-1) depend on the bits of the 
sequence {si} in the following way: if si= 1, then the corresponding sub-index oj 
equals the sub-index i, oj= i. All the sub-indices are taken module 2A-1, that is to 
say, the period of the sequence {ai}. 
Proof. Since the period of the PN-sequence {si} is (2S – 1), the number of bits 
with value 1 in a period is exactly 2S-1, and all the elements of any column of IC 
come from the same term si= 1 of the PN-sequence, the above expression for the 
matrix IC in terms of the elements of {ai} is obtained.   
 
According to the assumption s0= 1, the sub-index o0= 0. Next, the following 
result analyzes the characteristics of the columns of the matrix IC. 
 
Theorem 3.2 
The sequences {dj}= {ak+oj : k= 0, (2S - 1), 2 ⋅ (2S - 1), L, (2A - 2) ⋅ (2S - 1)} 
(j= 0, 1, L, 2(S-1)-1) corresponding to the columns of the matrix IC are shifted 
versions of a unique PN-sequence whose characteristic polynomial is given by: 
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)1(2 222 NNNN
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where N is an integer defined as N= 20 + 21 + L + 2(S-1) and α ∈ GF(2A) is a root 
of the primitive polynomial PA(x). 
Proof. Every sequence {dj} corresponding to the j-th column of IC is a regular 
decimation of the PN-sequence {ai}. More precisely, such a sequence is obtained 
by taking one out of (2S-1) terms in {ai}. The primality between A and S 
guarantees the primality between (2A-1) and (2S-1). Thus, the decimated sequence 
{dj} is also a PN-sequence. In addition, as every {dj} is obtained from {ai} with a 
decimation ratio of value (2S-1), then its characteristic polynomial PD(x) is the 
polynomial of the cyclotomic coset (2S-1) in the Galois Field GF(2A) generated by 
the roots of the polynomial PA(x) (Caballero-Gil and Fúster-Sabater, 2006). The 
starting point of each {dj} is given by the corresponding sub-index oj.   
 
4 Cryptanalytic Attack 
 
The proposed cryptanalytic attack consists in the computation of the initial states 
of both registers SRA and SRS. In fact, from some known bits of the shrunken 
sequence we have to determine the first A bits (a0, a1, …, aA-1) of the sequence 
{ai} as well as the first S bits (s0, s1, …, sS-1) of the sequence {si}. This attack can 
be divided into two different steps. In the first one, the computation of the initial 
state of SRA is carried out. In the second step and based on the SRA initial state, 
we determine the corresponding initial state of the register SRS. 
 
4.1 SRA Initial State 
 
Previously to the computation of the initial state, the following result is 
introduced. 
 Journal of Research and Practice in Information Technology, Vol. 41, No. 2, May 2009 
 
Lemma 4.1 
Given A bits of the shrunken sequence corresponding to A successive elements 
of any column of IC, the remaining bits of such a column can be determined. 
Proof. Theorem 3.2 determines the characteristic polynomial PD(x) of the PN-
sequence corresponding to every column of IC. Thus, by knowing A successive 
bits of any column and its characteristic polynomial, the linear recurrence 
relationship allows us to compute the remaining bits of such a column.   
 
The computation of the SRA initial state is described in the next result. 
 
Theorem 4.2 
Given A bits of the shrunken sequence corresponding to A successive elements 
of the first column of IC, the bits of the initial state of the register SRA can be 
determined. 
Proof. Lemma 4.1 shows that the knowledge of A successive elements of the 
first column of IC allows us to generate the remaining bits of such a column. On 
the other hand, from Theorem 3.1 we know that the (n + 1)-th element of the first 
column of IC corresponds to
)12( −⋅ Sna , that is to say, the (n ⋅ (2S -1) + 1)-th term of 
the sequence generated by the register SRA. Consequently, we first solve the 
following system of modular equations in the unknowns ni 
)),1(,,1,0()12mod()12( −=−≡−⋅ Aiin ASi K   (5) 
and then we compute successively the (ni+1)-th (i= 0, 1, …, (A-1)) elements of 
the first column of IC in order to obtain a0, a1, …,aA-1, respectively.   
 
4.2 SRS Initial State 
 
The computation of the SRS initial state is described in the next result. 
 
Theorem 4.3 
Given A⋅S bits of the shrunken sequence corresponding to the top-left corner 
(A × S) sub-matrix of IC, the bits of the initial state of the register SRS can be 
determined. 
Proof. Firstly, from the knowledge of the (A × S) sub-matrix of IC, 












=
−+−⋅−+−⋅−+−⋅−−⋅−
−+−⋅+−⋅+−⋅−⋅
−+−⋅+−⋅+−⋅−⋅
−+−+−+−−
−
)1()12()1(2)12()22(1)12()22()12()22(
)1()12(32)12(31)12(3)12(3
)1()12(22)12(21)12(2)12(2
)1()12(2)12(1)12()12(
)1(210
SoAoo
Sooo
Sooo
Sooo
Sooo
SSASASA
SSSS
SSSS
SSSS
aaaa
aaaa
aaaa
aaaa
aaaa
IC
L
MMMMM
L
L
L
L
 
and according to Lemma 4.1, we can deduce the remaining bits of those S 
columns. Secondly, the relative shifts among columns may be computed from the 
comparison between consecutive columns. Since the sequence in every column of 
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IC is exactly the same but starting at different points given by aoj, as soon as a 
relative shift is found, the sub-index oj may be easily computed. In addition, each 
sub-index oj indicates the position of the (j + 1)-th 1 in the initial state of SRS 
while the intermediate bits are 0's. Thus, the above procedure can be repeated for 
j= 1, 2, … till we get oj ≥ (S-1). In this way, the initial state of the register SRS is 
thoroughly determined.   
 
4.3 Illustrative Example 
 
Let us consider a shrinking generator characterized by: 
(1) SRA with length A= 5, characteristic polynomial PA(x)= x5+ x4+ x3+ x2+ 1 
and output sequence {ai}. 
 (2) SRS with length S= 4, characteristic polynomial PS(x)= x4+ x3 + 1 and 
output sequence {si}. 
(3) The characteristic polynomial of the shrunken sequence is Pss(x)= PD(x)p= 
(x5+ x3+ x2+ x+ 1)8. 
Given 20 bits of the shrunken sequence corresponding to a (5 × 4) top-left corner 
sub-matrix of IC 










=
1000
1110
1010
1001
1101
ICSUB , 
we can launch a cryptanalytic attack against the shrinking generator in order to 
obtain the initial states of both LFSRs. Table 1 shows the computations carried 
out for cryptanalyzing the above described generator. The most left column 
represents the indices of rows in the IC matrix, ni= 0, 1,…, 30. Next column 
shows the position of the terms (a0, a1, …, a4) of the sequence {ai} in the first 
column {do} of the matrix IC, obtained from Theorem 3.1. The following columns 
of the Table 1 represent the matrix IC: in boldface the (5 × 4) sub-matrix with the 
known bits, the remaining bits of {d0} are the bits computed to determine the 
initial states of SRA and SRS, and the symbols - correspond to unknown bits of the 
shrunken sequence. 
 
Computation of the SRA initial state: According to Theorem 4.2, we compute 
the positions of the (ni+1)-th elements of the first column of IC by solving the 
equation system  
).4,,1,0(31mod15 K=≡⋅ iini  
 
That is to say, n0= 0, n1= 29, n2= 27, n3= 25 and n4= 23. Then, by means of 
the characteristic polynomial PD(x) we determine the values of the (ni+1)-th (i= 0, 
1, ..., 4) elements of the first column {d0} of IC. Consequently, a0= 1, a1= 0, a2= 
0, a3= 1 and a4= 1 (see Table 1). Therefore, the initial state of the register SRA (1, 
0, 0, 1, 1) has been determined. 
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Computation of the SRS initial state: According to Theorem 4.3, we compute 
the relative shifts between consecutive columns in the matrix IC: 
- Computation of o1: We know a1 at the (29+1)-th position of the first column 
and compute its S- 1= 4 successive bits in the column. We compare these 5 bits 
(0, 0, 1, 1, 0) with the first 5 bits (0, 0, 1, 1, 0) of the second column {d1} (see 
Table 1) and find that there is a coincidence, thus o1= 1. 
- Computation of o2: We know a2 at the (27+1)-th position of the {d0} and 
compute its 4 successive bits. We compare these 5 bits (0, 1, 0, 0, 1) with the first 
5 bits (1, 0, 0, 1, 0) of the third column {d2}. There is no coincidence, thus we 
analyze the following bit a3. We know a3 at the (25+1)-th position of {d0} and 
compute its 4 successive bits. We compare these 5 bits (1, 0, 0, 1, 0) with the first 
5 bits (1, 0, 0, 1, 0) of {d2} (see Table 1). There is coincidence, thus o2= 3. Since 
o2= 3≥ S - 1, we have determined the initial state of SRS. In fact, s0= 1, o1= 1 
implies s1= 1, o2= 3 implies s2= 0 and s3= 1. Therefore, the SRS initial state is (s0, 
s1, s2, s3)= (1, 1, 0, 1). Note that only the knowledge of three columns of the sub-
matrix has been necessary to identify the initial state of SRS. Indeed, this number 
equals the number of bits 1 in the initial state of the selector register. The 
maximum number of known bits corresponds to SRS initial state with all bits 1. In 
the remaining cases, fewer bits are sufficient. 
Once the initial states of both register are determined, the whole shrunken 
sequence that is the keystream sequence can be computed. 
 
Table 1. Matrix IC corresponding to the described SG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4 Computational Features of the Attack 
 
The computational complexity of the proposed cryptanalytic attack must be 
analyzed by distinguishing two different phases: off-line and on-line, each one 
with its corresponding computational complexity. 
ni {ai} d0 d1 d2 d3 d4 L d7 
0 a0 1 0 1 1 - - - 
1  1 0 0 1 - - - 
2  0 1 0 1 - - - 
3  0 1 1 1 - - - 
4  0 0 0 1 - - - 
5  - - - - - - - 
L  - - - - - - - 
23 a4 1 - - - - - - 
24  - - - - - - - 
25 a3 1 - - - - - - 
26  0 - - - - - - 
27 a2 0 - - - - - - 
28  1 - - - - - - 
29 a1 0 - - - - - - 
30  0 - - - - - - 
 Journal of Research and Practice in Information Technology, Vol. 41, No. 2, May 2009 
 
Off-line computational complexity: Corresponding to the phase that is to be 
executed before intercepting sequence. It includes: 
• Computation of the characteristic polynomial PD(x) by means of equation (4). 
This computation is necessary in order to obtain the linear recurrence 
relationship for the terms of the PN-sequence. 
• Computation of the positions ni (i= 0, 1, …, A-1) on the first column of the 
matrix IC by means of equation (5). This computation is necessary in order to 
determine the bits of the initial state of SRA.  
• Computation of different elements of the extension field GF(2A), that is to say, 
inα  (i=0, 1, …, A-1), by means of the Zech log table method (Assis and 
Pedreira, 2000) for arithmetic over GF(2A). This computation is necessary in 
order to determine the A successive elements of each ai (i= 0, 1, …, A-1) on 
the first column of the matrix IC. 
 
On-line computational complexity: Corresponding to the phase that is to be 
executed after intercepting sequence. Consequently, it can be considered the 
computational complexity of the proposed attack in practice. According to the 
previous subsections, the computational method for the computation of the SRS 
initial state consists in the comparison of series of bits coming from formulated 
hypothesis and from intercepted bits. The comparison is carried out by means of a 
few bitwise logical operations on a bounded number of bits, so the worst-case 
computational complexity is O(A), linear in the length of the SRA. 
Finally, after comparing the proposed attack with those found in the literature 
we get that all of them are exponential in the lengths of the registers. In particular, 
the complexity of the divide-and-conquer attack proposed in (Simpsom et al, 
1998) is O(2S). The probabilistic correlation attack described in (Golic and 
O'Connors, 1995) has a computational complexity of value O(A2⋅ 2A). Also the 
probabilistic correlation attack introduced in (Johansson, 1998) is exponential in 
A. In contrast with the previous attacks, in this work a deterministic attack has 
been proposed that improves the complexity of the previous cryptanalytic 
approaches and that requires only A⋅ S intercepted shrunken bits in order to be 
launched. 
 
5 Generalization to Interleaved Sequences 
 
First of all, we introduce the general definition of interleaved sequence (Jiang et 
al, 2002). 
 
Definition 5.1  
Let f(x) be a polynomial over GF(q) of degree r and let m be a positive 
integer. For any sequence {uk} over GF(q), we write k= i⋅ m+ j with (i= 0, 1,…) 
and (j= 0, ..., m-1). If every sub-sequence of {uk} defined as {ui⋅m+j} is generated 
by f(x), then the sequence {uk} is called interleaved sequence over GF(q) of size m 
associated with the polynomial f(x). 
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Table 2 shows the interleaved sequence {uk} over GF(2) associated with the 3-
degree characteristic polynomial f(x)= x3+ x+ 1 over GF(2) and size m= 4. 
Reading by rows, the interleaved sequence is {uk}= {1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 
0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0} while by columns the sequence is made 
out of {uj} (j= 0, 1, 2, 3) four shifted versions of the PN-sequence generated by 
f(x). 
 
Table 2. Interleaved sequence with 4 shifted versions of the same PN-sequence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interleaved sequences are currently used as keystream sequences with 
application in cryptography. They can be generated in different ways: 
(1) By a LFSR controlled by another LFSR (which may be the same one) e.g. 
multiplexed sequences (Jennings, 1983), clock-controlled sequences (Beth and 
Piper, 1985), cascaded sequences (Gollmann and Chambers, 1989), shrinking 
generator sequences (Coppersmith et al, 1993), etc. 
(2) By one or more than one LFSR and a feed-forward nonlinear function, e.g. 
Gold-sequence family, Kasami (small and large set) sequence families, GMW 
sequences, Klapper sequences, No sequences etc. See (Gong, 1995) and the 
references cited therein. 
In brief, a large number of well-known cryptographic sequences are included 
in the class of interleaved sequences. Next, the link between interleaved 
sequences and shrunken sequences is expressed in the following result. 
 
Theorem 5.2 
Shrunken sequences are interleaved sequences of size 2(S-1). 
Proof. Let {zk} be a shrunken sequence with characteristic polynomial P(x)p 
where P(x) is an A-degree primitive polynomial and p is an integer in the interval 
2(S-2) < p ≤2(S-1). According to the interleaved configuration IC, we may express 
{zk} in terms of m sequences {zj} where {zj}= {zi⋅m+ j} with i≥ 0, m= 2(S-1) and (j= 
0, ..., m - 1). Since by Theorem 3.2 the sequences {zj} are generated by the same 
characteristic polynomial PD(x), we get that the shrunken sequence {zk} is an 
interleaved sequence of size 2(S-1) associated with the polynomial PD(x).   
 
The previous theorem proves that shrunken sequences are interleaved 
sequences. Moreover, section 4 shows that the knowledge of a number of bits of 
the shrunken sequence allows us to mount a cryptanalytic attack against the 
shrinking generator. As many cryptographic sequence generators produce 
u0 u1 u2 u3 
1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 0 
0 0 1 1 
0 1 0 1 
1 0 0 1 
0 1 1 0 
1 1 0 0 
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interleaved sequences, then the previous considerations take us into the following 
conjecture: 
 
Conjecture 5.3 
Given a number of known bits corresponding to a top-left corner sub-matrix of 
the interleaved configuration IC of any interleaved sequence, it is always possible 
to obtain the whole interleaved sequence.  
 
The confirmation of this conjecture would prove the weakness of interleaved 
generators for cryptographic purposes. 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
In this work a new deterministic cryptanalytic attack against the class of shrinking 
generators has been proposed. The amount of necessary intercepted bits and the 
on-line computational complexity of such an attack are much lesser than those of 
other standard cryptanalysis. The basic idea of the proposed attack consists in 
defining the shrunken sequence as an interleaved sequence, and then using the 
weaknesses inherent to its interleaved configuration for launching a practical 
attack. A direct consequence of this result is its possible generalization to other 
interleaved sequence generators of cryptographic purpose. Therefore, the security 
of all interleaved generators should be carefully checked. 
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